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INTRODUCTION
The idea that government spending is an important stimulus to cyclical economic activity is a popular one. It is supported by a long history of economic analyses. Traditional Keynesian IS-LM analysis explains that an increase in government spending directly boosts aggregate demand and, given underemployment, leads to accommodating expansions in employment and output. Indeed, due to a positive marginal propensity to consume, consumption rises along with output, reinforcing the increase in aggregate demand, so that the rise in government spending has multiplier effects on employment and output. More recently, real business cycle (RBC) studies of government spending (e.g., Aiyagari et al., 1992, Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992, and McGrattan 1994a, 1994b) reaffirm its importance as an impulse to the business cycle, envisaging a transmission mechanism that is different from the Keynesian one. In the RBC model, an increase in government spending works through a negative effect on private wealth to invoke expansions in employment and output. Moreover, for sufficiently persistent rises in government spending, employment and output increase enough to permit the accumulation of capital, which in turn calls forth further expansions of employment and output in a manner reminiscent of Keynesian multiplier effects. Because shocks to government spending sharply differ from technology shocks by inducing opposite co-movements between labor and its average productivity, the RBC studies argue that government spending is especially important for explaining labor market dynamics over the cycle. and the productivity of government capital generally mitigate the ability of government consumption and government investment, respectively, to explain features of the U.S. data.
The quantitative theoretical investigation undertaken here necessarily involves estimation of the stochastic processes followed by four exogenous variables: technology, government consumption, government investment, and government employment. This exercise uses data on the U.S. economy (1950:1-1993: 4). Estimates of the stochastic processes indicate that technology movements are not caused by changes in any of the three government variables. On the other hand, evidence of causality running from technology to each of the three government variables, especially to the investment and employment ones, is found, suggesting that government's decisions respond to the state of the economy as reflected in technology. This unidirectional pattern of causality has an interesting and important implication, identified through quantitative model analysis. The positive responses of the government variables to the state of the economy, as captured by technology, go far to explain why they, particularly government investment and government employment, are procyclical over the U.S. cycle. That is, the procyclicality of the government variables is due not so much to their own positive effects on output but rather to their positive responses to the output fluctuations generated by technology movements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model economy. Section 3 provides a qualitative discussion of how government affects the model economy. Section 4 describes the model calibration and simulation. Section 5 presents the quantitative analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
THE MODEL ECONOMY
Consider an economy with a representative firm and household and a government. These agents interact in a variety of ways within a perfectly competitive market structure. Stochastic exogenous shocks to technology, government consumption, government investment, and government employment are the sources of fluctuations in the economy. A more exact description of the economy's structure and competitive equilibrium follows.
2.1. Structure. Taking market prices as given, the firm maximizes profit from goods production by optimally choosing labor and capital, that is:
(1) max 7t =yt -wtnP -rtkP (itP, k P) subject to the production function:
(2) yt = F(ztnP, kP, kg) =(ztnP)0(kP)(1 0)(kg)v
0<6<1, v>0
The notation in equation (1) is: IT is profit, y is output, w is the wage rate of labor, nP is labor hired by the private firm, r is the rental rate of capital, and kV is capital rented by the private firm and in place at the start of the period. In equation (2), z is an exogenous shock to technology, kg is the government's capital, and 0 and v are parameters. The production function F displays the usual properties and constant returns to scale with respect to nP and kV. It differs from the standard neoclassical production function solely by the inclusion of kg. Freely made available by the government at the beginning of the period, kg is taken as given by the firm. The manner in which kg enters into (2) follows Aschauer (1989), admitting a direct relationship between kg and the productivity of nP and kV. This productivity effect of kg is one channel through which the government influences the economy. The infinitely lived household has preferences over consumption and labor that are defined in: where c and n are the household's consumption and labor supply, respectively, g is government consumption, 13 is the subjective discount factor, and a, Ai, and a are other preference parameters. Available time each period is normalized at unity. The momentary utility function U exhibits standard properties, though it differs from the usual neoclassical utility function by including g. Aschauer and Greenwood (1985) similarly allow U to depend on g. The idea is that g provides utility in so far as it substitutes for c. The degree of substitutability across g and c is directly determined by co. Thus, government can possibly affect the economy through the utility effect of g.
Each period, the household invests some of the economy's good to form the capital stock kV in accordance with the law of motion: where i is the household's gross investment, and SP is a constant depreciation rate. Also each period, the household faces a budget constraint that sets its total income equal to its total spending: where f is a transfer payment from the government to the household, q is the net real interest rate, b is the household's stock of one-period bonds, each of which pays out (1 + q) units of goods upon maturity, and rI and Tr are government-imposed tax rates on the household's labor and capital income, respectively. In equation (5), income comprises of after-tax labor and capital income, transfers and bond returns; spending is on consumption, investment, and new bonds. Capital income is not fully taxed-allowance is made for depreciation. The proportional tax rates on household income constitute additional avenues through which the government has economic effects.3 The household's problem may now be stated. It is to maximize lifetime utility in (3) by optimally choosing c, n, and i subject to the constraints in (4)-(5). In doing so, the household takes market prices, g, and f as given.
Government's economic activities include purchasing goods for consumption and investment purposes, hiring labor, taxing income, and making transfer payments. Like the household, the government faces a budget constraint setting its total income equal to its total spending each period: (6) 1r1 nt + fc(rt -SP) kP +dt+1 =g, +x, +wtng+fl
where d is the government's stock of one-period debt, each unit of which pays out (1 + q) units of goods upon maturity, x is government investment, and ng is labor hired by the government. Equation (6) shows that income consists of income-tax revenue and the proceeds from new debt issue; spending is on consumption, investment, labor employment, transfers, and debt redemption. Government's investment creates the capital stock kg subject to the law of motion:
(7) ktg 1 = ( 1 -89)k~g + x,, 0 < 59 < 1 where 8g is a constant depreciation rate. Exogenously to the model economy, the government chooses g, x, and ng each period, and sets T and TC once-and-for-all. Market prices, n, and kP are taken as given by the government. Thus, from (6), f and/or d endogenously adjust to ensure that the budget constraint is satisfied.4 The last channel through which government influences the economy is now evident, namely, ng. It is also worth emphasizing that even if g did not have utility effects and x, working through kg, did not have production effects, both g and x would still impact on the economy. The reason is that g and x constitute absorptions of the economy's resources. In fact, when g does not substitute in utility for c (i.e., when co = 0), g has its maximum private wealth effect and, thus, its largest effect on the economy.
The specification of the stochastic processes of the four exogenous variables: z, g, x, and ng, is as follows. Equations (9) and (10), the outcomes of firm maximizing behavior, show that factor prices equal their respective marginal productivities. The household's intratemporal and intertemporal efficiency conditions governing its labor supply and investment are equations (11) and (12), respectively. Equation (13) states that the labor market clears-labor supply equals the sum of the firm's and government's labor demands. The economy's resource constraint is equation (14), showing that the consumption and investment of households and government completely absorb output. It derives from substituting the government budget constraint (6) into the household budget constraint (5), while noting the bond market clearing condition (bt = dt), labor market equilibrium (equation (13)), and the factor pricing equations ((9) and (10)).
QUALITATIVE WORKINGS OF GOVERNMENT SHOCKS
To provide intuition on how the government impacts on the model economy, particularly on private employment and its average productivity, this section discusses the key qualitative effects of one-time innovations to each of the three exogenous variables: g, ng, and x. The discussion abstracts from interactions between these variables so as to clearly isolate their individual effects.
3.1. Innovation to g. Suppose a positive innovation increases g. So long as g is not perfectly substitutable for c in the utility of households, that is, w < 1, then the rise in g causes a negative private wealth effect. The reason is that the higher g means that more of the economy's goods are consumed by the government and, when cl < 1, the marginal utility of g is less than the marginal utility of c.5 Indeed, the marginal utility of g increasingly falls short of the marginal utility of c, the less well g substitutes for c or the lower is cl. Thus, the absolute size of the negative wealth effect is inversely related to the degree of substitutability between g and c, as measured by cl; being the largest when cl = 0. This negative wealth effect is important-it is the main channel through which g exerts effects on the economy.
In response to the negative wealth effect, c falls and n rises; n rises through an increase in nP. With kV and kg predetermined and z fixed, labor's average productivity (AP) declines as nP rises. Therefore, AP and nP move in opposite directions to one another. The increase in nP causes y to expand. Whether i rises or falls crucially depends on the persistency of the increase in g. The more persistent is the rise in g, the more likely it is that i rises too. The reason is that the absolute value of the negative wealth effect is directly proportional to the degree of persistency in the expansion of g. Therefore, the more persistent is the increase in g, the greater is the fall in c and rise in nP, both of which enhance the feasibility of an increase in i. Moreover, the expansion of nP is more persistent, raising the incentive to invest by raising capital's future marginal productivity. Note that since g is positively autocorrelated, all of the effects discussed above (relative to the steady state) persist for some time. The following schematic summarizes the effects of the rise in g.
Exogenous Shock Endogenous Responses
Tg TyTnPjAPjcTi 3.2. Innovation to ng. Next consider what happens when a positive innovation raises ng. The increase in ng has a negative effect on private wealth, because it expands government's usage of private resources. This negative wealth effect engenders a fall in c and a rise in n, as usual. But now, the increase in n occurs only through the increase in ng, and nP decreases. The reason is that the shock to ng directly impacts on n; it is accommodated partially by an expansion of n and partially by a contraction of nP. That is, there is a sectoral reallocation involving a shift of labor out of the private sector and into the government sector. Simultaneously with the decline in nP a rise in AP occurs, since z is fixed and kV and kg are predetermined. Thus, there is negative covariation between nP and AP. The decrease in nP causes y to contract. The more persistent is the expansion of ng, the more likely it is that i contracts too. Although the fall in c augments the possibility of a rise in i, the fall in nP tends to dominate in shrinking that possibility. In addition, when the increase in ng is persistent, so also is the decline of nP, which lowers the desire to invest by reducing capital's future marginal productivity. All of the foregoing effects (relative to the steady state) exhibit some persistency, stemming from the positive serial correlation of ng. A summary of the effects of a rise in ng is presented in the following schematic.
Tng ly nPTAP cIi 3.3. Innovation to x. How the economy responds to a positive innovation increasing x depends on the shock's size relative to the productivity of kg, that is, v. This dependence stems from the fact that the rise in x has two opposing effects on private wealth. One effect, proportional to the x shock, is contractionary; it arises because the increase in x, like the earlier increase in g, means that more of the economy's goods are absorbed by government. The second effect on wealth, positively related to v, is expansionary; arising since the higher x transforms over time into more kg and, thus, enhances the productivity of private factors. Therefore, what happens to wealth depends on the size of the shock relative to v. And this wealth effect determines much of the economy's subsequent course.
Suppose v is high relative to the shock size, so that the rise in x has a positive wealth effect. Because kg is predetermined, the economy's responses in the first period are quite different from those in later periods. In the first period, the positive wealth effect works to increase c and reduce nP. This fall in nP generates a rise in AP, given that z is fixed and kg and kV are predetermined. Opposite movements in nP and AP therefore occur. As nP declines, so too must y. The response of i is primarily dictated by feasibility considerations: the contraction of y together with the expansions in c and x force i to fall. That is, the increase in x 'crowds out' i. A summary of these first period responses is in the schematic:
Exogenous Shock First Period Endogenous Responses
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Over time the higher x builds into higher kg. Once kg begins rising, substantial improvements to productivity take place. By directly raising labor's marginal productivity, the increase in kg prompts a powerful intratemporal substitution effect that reinforces the rise in c and outweighs the income effect on nP, causing nP to rise. The higher kg directly increases AP also, so that nP and AP now move together. y increases in response to the increases in nP and kg. The two key forces operating to raise i are: the improvement in kV's future marginal productivity due to the higher kg, and the enhanced feasibility of expanding i because y has increased. Note that the positive autocorrelation of x implies that kg rises for a protracted period of time. Consequently, kg's effects on the economy (relative to the steady state) display strong persistence. The economy's second period and later responses to the x shock are summarized in the following schematic.
Exogenous Shock Second Period and Later Endogenous Responses Tx TyTnPTAPTcTi
When the size of the shock to x is high relative to v, so that the x increase generates a negative wealth effect, the pattern of economic events is different to that described above. But, the difference is manifested only in the first period. Because of the negative wealth effect, the rise in x initially acts just like a rise in g. Therefore, the economy's first-period responses are identical to those discussed earlier in the case of g's expansion. Economic effects in the second and later periods are once again driven by the increase in kg and, thus, are the same as those described earlier in this subsection. The parameters of the stochastic exogenous processes in (8) are estimated from the U.S. data. This estimation involved several tasks. First, due to the absence of published U.S. data on z, an empirical U.S. z series was derived by 'solving' the production function in equation (2), given the calibrated values of 0 and v and the published U.S. data on y, nP, kV, and kg. Second, because all four U.S. series on z, g, x, and ng exhibit trending behavior, they were detrended to obtain their stationary components that more closely correspond to the model's stationary z, g, x, and ng7 Third, using the stationary U.S. data on the four exogenous variables, the system of equations in (8) is estimated. Seemingly-unrelated regression (SUR), the estimation method, provides efficient parameter estimates in the presence of contemporaneous correlations between the innovations. Table 2 displays the results from the unrestricted estimation of (8). z, does not significantly depend on gt_ 1, xt_ 1 or ng 1 individually. Moreover, the model's identification hypothesis that z, is unaffected by g,-1, x,_1 and ng 1 jointly cannot be rejected at the standard 10 per cent significance level.8 Thus, the model's identification assumption is imposed on (8), permitting further gains in estimation efficiency. The findings from the restricted estimation of (8) are shown in Table 3 . Notice that each exogenous variable is highly and positively autocorrelated. zt-1 has a positive effect on the three government variables, especially on x,. All three government variables interact with one another, the most powerful connections 7Detrending was accomplished as follows. First, the logarithm of each exogenous variable was regressed on a constant and a polynomial-of-order-three in time. Second, the estimated polynomial time trend was subtracted from the logarithm of the respective exogenous variable to obtain its stationary component. A polynomial of up to order three, allowing for slowly evolving movements in trend, was necessary to extract the stationary components. Estimates of these trends are available upon request. 8 The joint test, a likelihood ratio test, is distributed as a chi-squared statistic and has a marginal significance level equal to 0.49, which is bigger than the standard 0.10 threshold criterion. being the positive ones between g and ng. The restricted estimates in Table 3 covariation between nP and AP is negative."1 Less well known are the features of the government variables in the U.S. cycle. g, x, and ng are substantially more volatile than y. All three government variables are procyclical, but just mildly so.
The questions of prime concern to the present study are: does government significantly influence the U.S. cycle and, if so, which of government's activities: g, x, and ng provide the most important impulses? Answers to these questions are pursued through a quantitative analysis of the model economy outlined earlier. The quantitative analysis begins by examining the cyclical contribution of independent shocks to g, x, and ng. The sensitivity of this contribution to the magnitudes of critical 'government parameters' is checked. Next, the importance of government's size, measured by its expenditure and labor shares, is brought to the forefront. The issues involved here lead to an illustration of why the distinction between government's goods purchases and employment matters substantively. Finally, the quantitative analysis assesses the full cyclical contribution of g, x, and ng when account is taken of their rich patterns of interaction with one another and with the state of the economy as captured by z.
Isolating the Contribution of Government
Shocks. This subsection isolates the business cycle effects of independent variations in the three government variables. To achieve this isolation, the model economy is simulated with a stochastic shock structure that simplifies the system in equation (8) along two dimensions: (i) any nonzero and nondiagonal element of A1 is set equal to zero and, (ii) all of the nonzero contemporaneous correlations among the innovations are equated to zero. With these restrictions in place, the four exogenous variables: z, g, x, and ng are independent of each other. In addition, the model economy is simulated under alternative assumptions about which, if any, of the three government variables are subject to stochastic shocks. That is, sometimes the model simulation holds some of the government variables constant. Table 5 Comparison of panel A to the U.S. data in Table 4 reveals that the model economy driven exclusively by shocks to z mimics many of the popular features of the U.S. cycle. However, there are some glaring discrepancies too-all involving nP. The model significantly understates the volatility of nP and, due to its reliance on z shocks, well overstates both the correlations between AP and y and between AP and nP. If shocks to the government variables play an important role in the U.S. cycle, then incorporating them into the model should promote the match between the model and the U.S. facts. Most especially, the government shocks potentially explain the behavior involving nP. For as was discussed in Section 3, each of g, x, and ng not only impact on nP making it more volatile, but also induce opposite movements of AP and y as well as of AP and nP. By comparing panels C, D and E to panel A, the separate effects of the independent government shocks may be seen. The joint effects of all three independent g, x, and ng shocks are evident from a comparison of panels A and B. Even when the independent shocks to the three government variables are combined, they do not substantively bring the model's cyclical behavior into closer alignment with the U.S. data's. The strongest contribution comes from g in terms of reducing the correlation between AP and nP, but it is not nearly powerful enough to rationalize the negative U.S. AP-nP correlation.
Recall from Section 3 that the model predicts that increases in g raise y, x's effects on y are ambiguous, and expansions of ng contract y. These effects are illustrated in panel B-g is procyclical, x is acyclical, and ng is countercyclical. The model economy with independent variations in z, g, x, and ng well explains the procyclicality of g, but cannot capture the procyclicality of both x and ng that is evident in the U.S. data. Overall, the findings of this subsection suggest that government does not significantly cause cyclical fluctuations in the U.S. economy. Table 1) Table 3 . The reason is that the empirical U.S. z series changes as the value of v does. Thus, the estimation exercise described in Section 4 was repeated using the new U.S. z series corresponding to v = 0.32. The resultant new parameterization of the stochastic shock structure is similar to the old one. These estimation findings are available upon request. Table 6 to the benchmark economy of panel B in Table 5 . The changes in tax rates do not materially influence the model's cyclical characteristics. Raising v has the one main effect of making x countercyclical. This countercyclicality stems from the fact that v's rise switches the wealth effect of x increases from zero to positive. And, as Section 3 explained, wealth effects then operate to cause declines in y whenever x rises. The most noticeable effects of setting wt equal to one are: g becomes acyclical, the correlation between AP and nP increases, c is more volatile and covaries less with y. These effects are also due to a change in wealth effects. When g perfectly substitutes for c, g's effect on wealth, the main channel of its influence, disappears. Thus, when wt equals one, g does not impact much on the economy. Instead, c moves to offset most of the changes in g.
Sensitivity to Central
values (listed earlier in
To assess the effects of the alterations in parameter values, compare
In summary, the sensitivity analysis shows that only the changes in wt and v notably affect government's cyclical contribution. But, making g more substitutable for c (i.e., increasing t) or government capital more productive (i.e., raising v) worsens the correspondence between the model and U.S. data. Thus, the benchmark parameterization of the model economy allows more leeway for government shocks to explain U.S. cycles. where s9 and sx are the shares of g and x, respectively, in y. Table 7 presents the simulation results, with each panel indicating which government share has been increased above its benchmark value by displaying the new share value. A comparison of Table 7 to the benchmark economy of panel B in Table 5 shows the effects of raising government's shares. Of particular note are the effects of the larger shares in terms of: increasing the volatility of nP (generally) and weakening the covariations between AP and y and between AP and nP.13 In addition, g is Table 4 for notes. sg and sX, respectively, denote the shares of government consumption and investment in private output. more procyclical, x becomes procyclical, and ng is more countercyclical. The procyclicality of x is produced from the phenomenon that the rising share of x switches the wealth effect of x increases from zero to negative. As was explained in Section 3, wealth effects then work to induce expansions in y whenever x expands. The other mentioned effects of bigger government shares are understandable from the earlier discussions of how g, x, and ng impact on the economy and by noting that any shock to g, x, or ng now translates into a larger absolute change. A shock is measured as a percentage deviation from the variable's average value-so it is absolutely bigger when the variable's share is. Thus, government's shares are seen to matter substantially. Their values in the U.S. economy are small enough to prevent the highly volatile g, x, and ng processes from significantly influencing U.S. cyclical fluctuations.
Why Government's Shares
Mistaking the Contribution of g Shocks.
Seeing how the higher share of g promotes the strength of g's cyclical effects above, provides a hint as to why existing RBC studies (e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992, and McGrattan 1994a, 1994b) argue that g is an important impulse to U.S. business cycle fluctuations and, particularly, to U.S. labor market dynamics. The reason is that those studies do not distinguish between government's spending on consumption goods and labor employment, and instead treat the sum of the two types of spending as a homogeneous expenditure on consumption goods only. One implication of this aggregation is that the RBC studies of g shocks overstate g's correct share in the U.S. economy and, consequently, the true contribution of g shocks to U.S. cycles.
For instance, consider a model economy identical to the one in Section 2 except that ng is always zero. Add wage compensation of government employees to government consumption to obtain an expanded U.S. measure of g. Calibrate the new model economy to the same preset parameter and steady state variable values listed in Table 1 where vi is the innovation to variable j (Q = z, g, x) and constant terms have been omitted for simplicity. New estimates of the stochastic exogenous shock processes are necessary primarily because of the new measure of g in the U.S. data.14 The findings from simulating the new model economy are in Table 8 . Specifically, in panel A the model is driven solely by shocks to z, with g and x held constant. Variations to g (only) are added to those of z in panel B. Thus, comparing panels A and B illustrates the effects of g shocks. g strongly enhances the volatility of nP, moderates the linkage between AP and y, and significantly reduces the correlation between AP and n P. The power of these effects of g sharply contrasts with g's weak effects earlier in this section. The contrast is especially remarkable because the volatility of g is now substantially lower than it was before (compare o 2 across the two cases). But, to conclude like the aforementioned RBC studies that g is, therefore, an important driving force of U.S. fluctuations would be a mistake-one predicated from not distinguishing between government's spending on employment and consumption. 5.5. Allowing Interactions Between Shock Processes. To assess the full cyclical contribution of g, x, and ng, this subsection simulates the original model economy taking account of the patterns of interaction between z, g, x, and ng evident from the estimates of the stochastic shock structure, equation (8), presented in Table 3. 14 The new estimates were derived by repeating the estimation exercise described in Section 4 and the method of extracting independent components described earlier in this section, for the three variable system consisting of z, g, and x. This estimation uses the sum of government consumption and wage compensation to measure g in the U.S. data. The full set of estimation results is available upon request. Table 4 It must be emphasized that these findings pertain only to the cyclical effects of government spending. They carry no implication regarding government's effects on the overall level of economic activity. Government can and does substantially promote the level of economic activity in a variety of ways, for example, providing infrastructure, advancing education and research, and maintaining law and order. Instead, the findings here suggest that government spending is not, contrary to popular opinion, a prime instigator of the short-run periodic fluctuations in economic activity around its average trending level. Private Capital Stock (billions of 1987 dollars). Net domestic fixed nonresidential capital stock of the private sector and government enterprises plus the same type of capital that is government owned but privately operated (GOPO capital). The components of this capital stock are available only on an annual basis from DC. A quarterly private capital series was derived in the following fashion. First, the quarterly depreciation rate of private capital was estimated. This quarterly estimate is one quarter of the annual depreciation rate estimated from the private capital accumulation equation, i.e. (4) in the text, using annual time series on private investment and capital (described above). Second, the quarterly private capital stock series was obtained by iterating on equation (4), using the quarterly private investment series, the quarterly depreciation rate and the value of the private capital stock at the end of 1949.
Government Capital Stock (billions of 1987 dollars). Net domestic fixed nonresidential nonmilitary capital stock of government less the component consisting of enterprise and GOPO capital. As in the case of private capital, the components of government capital are available only annually from DC. A quarterly government capital series was obtained in a manner analogous to that of the quarterly private capital series. In doing so, annual time series on government capital (described above) and both annual and quarterly time series on government investment (described above) were used.
Interpolation. To derive quarterly government, enterprise and GOPO investment series from the corresponding annual series, the interpolation procedure uses information in government total purchases. This information is useful because the government total purchase series is available at a quarterly frequency and it includes the three government-related investment series. Specifically, the interpolation rule equates the fraction of annual government, enterprise or GOPO investment occurring in any given quarter to the proportion of annual government purchases taking place in that same quarter.
